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1 – Introduction
The positivist legacy still looms large in philosophy of science 
and ‘metaphysics’ remains a discredited word, most often 
used with reluctance. This essay aims at revising what I see 
as the unjustified criticism of metaphysics that is now being 
recycled by naturalistic metaphysicians against non-natura-
listic metaphysicians. In fact, most of the criticism directed 
at ‘analytical’ non-naturalistic metaphysics is centuries-old 
criticism that has been directed at metaphysics in general. I 
begin with the minor charges and then move on to the major 
charge: the independence of experience, from which the mi-
nor charges actually derive.
I do not intend, in any way, to undertake a defence of ‘analy-
tic’ non-naturalistic metaphysics. I am much more interested 
in a metaphysics that clearly states its relationship with 
science, though I disagree with the way many naturalistic 
metaphysicians conceive that relationship. I believe that me-
taphysics, as its name suggests, is defined by its close rela-
tionship with physics, with science. I thus suspect that even 
‘analytical’ non-naturalistic metaphysics does maintain a link 
with science, since both are interested in the nature of reality. 
2 – Sterility, Futility
One of the oldest accusations against metaphysics is that it 
is a sterile, futile or empty practice. Nowadays naturalistic 
metaphysicians recycle this accusation by stating that if the 
content of metaphysical theories does not come from science, 
they are doomed to sterility and emptiness. For instance, 
Craig Callender writes that
(…) many metaphysicians have adopted an approach to the field 
that makes it more or less autonomous from science. Not only 
is this a shame, given the current context within science, but it 
is also a bad idea, for it occasionally results in debates in meta-
physics becoming sterile or even empty. (Callender 2011, p. 34).
There are two main reasons behind this old accusation: 
firstly, left alone, metaphysics supposedly devotes its time to 
irrelevant issues, as suggested by Callender’s quote; secondly, 
in a metaphysical debate, there are no winners or losers. No-
thing is decided once and for all, while in science, and due to 
its empirical experiments, the opposite supposedly happens. 
As early as 1955, in his book The Structure of Metaphysics, 
Morris Lazerowitz pointed out the chronic lack of precise 
conclusions in metaphysical debates. And though Lazerowitz 
recognized the power of metaphysics as an intellectual phe-
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nomenon, he found it misleading and even mysterious: no-
body seems to know very well what metaphysics is. We only 
know that it is not what it seems: it seems deep and wide, but 
its results are fragile and debatable. Lazerowitz recognized, 
however, something far more important: that there is a bond 
between ‘solid’ science and sterile metaphysics. Strangely 
enough, ‘solid’ science stands on bold and shaky metaphysi-
cal assumptions, such as that nature is uniform:
Metaphysics presents us with an intellectual phenomenon that 
is both remarkable and mystifying. It is without doubt one of the 
highest of man’s cultural achievements, combining both gran-
deur of conception and subtlety of thought. But what it is, its 
nature, remains unknown to us. It looks to be the deepest of the 
sciences, in which the attempt is made to arrive at an understan-
ding of the ultimate constitution of the world, its basic material 
and structure, and of the nature and limits of our knowledge. 
Further, metaphysics has a scope, by comparison with which 
the ordinary sciences, with their laboratory techniques, appear 
to comprehend only the surface mechanics of the material uni-
verse, while, moreover, resting on tremendous assumptions 
that are the proper province of metaphysics, e.g., that nature is 
uniform. But although metaphysics looks like science, it differs 
from science in an important aspect. (…) No one, except a person 
who must for some reason blind himself to the facts, can fail to 
contrast the special sciences, with their imposing edifices of solid 
results, and metaphysics, with its chronic condition of endless 
and unresolved debates. (Lazerowitz 1955, p. 23)
Even though, according to Lazerowitz, metaphysics ‘looks 
like a science’, and this was what Rudolf Carnap most dis-
liked about it (1932), we have to agree that with metaphysics 
alone, airplanes cannot be built and livers cannot be healed. 
It is science, with its ‘laboratory techniques’, that is able to 
do these things. However, as Lazerowitz stresses, science’s 
‘solid’ results are not possible without metaphysics, without 
‘tremendous’ metaphysical assumptions. 
I wish to emphasise this point: no special science can be 
performed without metaphysical assumptions. And, since 
science rests on metaphysical assumptions, it is an illusion to 
suppose that it can then operate as if it was independent from 
them. Even though I concede that scientific activity exhibits 
a considerable degree of autonomy, it does not exhibit a total 
independence from metaphysics. It is metaphysical assump-
tions that outline the range of ontological possibilities and 
enable the formulation of scientific hypotheses that can be 
empirically tested. Moreover, what is considered as reliable 
by empirical evidence and the very nature of that evidence, as 
well as the questions and answers that science deems accep-
table, depends on metaphysical assumptions. Science’s empi-
rical content cannot simply be separated from its theoretical 
and metaphysical content.
There are therefore two opposing positions on how metaphy-
sics should face the findings of science. Naturalists believe 
that there is a risk for metaphysics if it does not take into ac-
count the ‘results of science’. Metaphysical success can only 
be achieved by sheepishly following the success of science. 
Metaphysicians have no authority to tell scientists that they 
are mistaken. The other position is that scientific theories 
rest on metaphysical assumptions and metaphysicians thus 
have the right not only to criticize those assumptions but to 
think beyond science. 
That scientific theories rest on metaphysical assumptions 
is also acknowledged by some naturalistic metaphysicians, 
such as Anjan Chakravartty and Craig Callender. Callen-
der even describes the presence of metaphysics in science 
as being from top to bottom: ‘Indeed, I think that what we 
conventionally call science in ordinary affairs is inextri-
cably infused with metaphysics from top (theory) to bottom 
(experiment).’(Callender 2011, p. 48).
 
I fully agree with Callender’s statement. And I also agree with 
the naturalists on the importance for metaphysics of not exhi-
biting an indifferent attitude towards the findings of science. 
It seems a good strategy to start theorizing after being well 
informed about the available knowledge of our time. But this 
does not mean a total submission to that knowledge. Meta-
physicians have the right not only to criticize the metaphysi-
cal assumptions of science but also to think beyond science.
Contrary to the neo-kantians who are quite rightly classified 
as ‘false friends’ of metaphysics by E. J. Lowe (1998), I believe 
that metaphysics cannot be reduced to the merely descrip-
tive task of reproducing the so-called ‘results of science’, and 
for at least three reasons. Firstly, stricto sensu, ‘the results of 
science’ do not exist. The ‘results of science’ are never ‘neu-
tral’ but always subject to interpretation. They are therefore 
rarely consensual. Secondly, because scientific knowledge is 
based on assumptions that are metaphysical, and that there-
fore go beyond what science itself can legitimize. And thirdly, 
because scientific knowledge is subject to error and revision 
and philosophies that take science as a source of certainty are 
obsolete. 
Science as a territory of certainty is seen today as a naive 
belief. The ideal of science as a finished, necessary, true, sys-
tem has been revised and fallen out of favour. It has been 
replaced by the idea that there is no scientific access to cer-
tain knowledge, not only because knowledge is acquired by 
making mistakes, but also because of the very nature of the 
world: probabilism seems to reign over necessity, and it is 
therefore difficult to get accurate measurements and clear 
distinctions. 
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3 – Vagueness
Another old charge against metaphysics is that it is too 
‘vague’. For instance, Rudolf Carnap wrote: ‘this word [meta-
physics], through its historical past, contains for many a sug-
gestion of the vague and speculative’ (1928, p. 295). And Paul 
Weiss described in this way the prevailing image of metaphy-
sics of his time, largely influenced by logical positivism: ‘It is 
common today to say that metaphysical assertions are at best 
poetic and at worst nonsensical, and surely vague and unve-
rifiable’ (1970, p. 12). That metaphysics is impossibly vague 
is also a reiterated accusation to be found in the texts written 
nowadays by naturalistic metaphysicians. 
In his entry for ‘vague’ written for the 1902 Dictionary of Phi-
losophy and Psychology, C. S Peirce defined the term as fol-
lows: ‘A proposition is vague when there are possible states of 
things concerning which it is intrinsically uncertain whether, 
had they been contemplated by the speaker, he would have 
regarded them as excluded or allowed by the proposition.’ 
(Peirce 1902, p. 748). According to this technical sense, X is 
vague if there are cases in which we cannot determine whe-
ther some particular y is X or not. These are called border-
line cases. For instance, when does a seed start being a tree? 
When does a person start being old, or tall, or bald? When 
does temperature start being warm? Because no sharp lines 
can be drawn, the problem with sentences where borderline 
cases occur is that they resist the attempt to settle whether 
they are true or false. There is no way, empirical or concep-
tual, to settle if y is X or not.
There is a lively debate on whether vagueness is linguistic or 
metaphysical. In his 1923 article ‘Vagueness’, Bertrand Rus-
sell acknowledged, like many others, that vagueness pervades 
all language; language is intrinsically vague. Even our scien-
tific vocabulary is vague. However, Russell suggested that we 
cannot conclude that the world is vague from the fact that the 
language we use to describe the world is vague. Vagueness is 
linguistic, a mere feature of our language, not of the world. 
Others (J. R. G. Williams, E. Barnes) maintain that vague-
ness is metaphysical, that it is an objective feature of reality: 
some objects of the world have vague properties; or, more 
radically, there are vague objects in the world (maps, some 
music, mental imagery all seem to be vague). In the event that 
we are scientific realists, i.e., if we support the view that there 
are good reasons to believe that our best scientific theories 
are, at least, approximately true, and if those theories require 
the use of vague terms (for instance, ‘species’) to refer certain 
objects or properties, then we are allowed to posit the actual 
existence of such vague objects or properties. 
Many words used extensively by metaphysicians are indeed 
vague. In his Überwindung…, (1932) Rudolf Carnap re-
marked that no truth conditions can be given to  terms found 
in the alleged metaphysical propositions, such as ‘the abso-
lute’, ‘nothing’, ‘being’, ‘spirit’, ‘freedom’, ‘awareness’, ‘life’, 
‘manifestation, ‘non-being’, ‘thing in itself’, etc. The same 
applies to concepts such as ‘entelechy’ or ‘vital force’ which 
can be found in texts written by the vitalist biologists. Since 
there are no laws subject to empirical testing occurring in 
these terms, Carnap concluded they were devoid of meaning. 
But Carnap’s conclusion can hardly be sustained, as W. O. 
Quine showed in his ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951) and 
Karl Popper in his ‘The Demarcation Between Science and 
Metaphysics’ (1955), later a chapter of Conjectures and Refu-
tations (1963), and I shall not dwell longer on this topic here.
In texts criticizing metaphysics, the term ‘vague’ may also 
mean abnormally general. In the ‘Conclusion’ of his book 
L’activité rationaliste de la physique contemporaine, French 
philosopher Gaston Bachelard states that traditional phi-
losophy and metaphysics are presumptuous due to the fact 
that they dispense with experimental activity and endorse 
generalities. Metaphysicians dare to speak of things they do 
not understand. With no recourse to experience, they deli-
ver absolute formulas about the Whole. Bachelard picks up 
some isolated sentences as examples: ‘‘the universe is a uni-
fied whole’, ‘everything is in everything’, ‘nothing comes out 
of nothing,’ etc. The metaphysicians’ idea of ‘Whole’, says 
Bachelard, differs from the scientists’ idea of ‘all’, which is 
limited to a list of objects from a collection: ‘all atoms’, ‘all 
cells’, etc. Instead of endorsing  the scientific idea of ‘all’, me-
taphysicians endorse the vague, indefinite and obscure idea 
of a ‘whole’ (Bachelard 1951).
However, I believe ‘vagueness’ should not always be envi-
saged as a pejorative term or as an inferior quality, and 
indeed there are good reasons to believe in ‘metaphysical 
vagueness’. Even though, as we have seen, scientific language 
cannot escape vagueness, let’s concede that metaphysical 
vocabulary and theories are vaguer than scientific ones. The 
special sciences are sciences of the particular, and thus have 
a much more precise nature than metaphysics. The ‘vague’ 
nature of metaphysical theories stems largely from their de-
gree of universality and abstraction. Since they are less rich in 
content than scientific theories, their degree of generality is 
very high, and their vocabulary is often vague, metaphysical 
theories cannot be directly falsified (we will see later that they 
may be indirectly falsified). 
What should be taken into account is that the work of the 
special sciences rests on vague and general metaphysical 
hypotheses about the nature of the world. These hypotheses 
guide scientific research in its effort to become more elabo-
rate, precise and systematic. When science becomes the main 
character of the plot, its observational and experimental work 
transforms those vague hypotheses into ideas that are much 
more accurate, localized and rich in detail. The findings of 
science are elaborations, specifications, developments of 
those very general, vague hypotheses; they are the heir of the 
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original conception, albeit highly enriched by the whole pro-
cess. 
The idea of the world as ‘a whole’ to which objects belong, 
‘though vague’ or impossibly general, is essential for the reco-
gnition and interpretation of those objects. It is this idea of a 
global whole that allows the perception of the world not as a 
collection of discontinuities, of independent objects, but as 
a unity whose parts interact with one another. Hence it fol-
lows that the importance of vagueness is far from negligible. 
Without those vague metaphysical ideas observation could 
not even take place. They lie behind science’s layers of pre-
cision, accuracy and exact measurement. Scientific activity 
departs from a metaphysical scheme that decides the obser-
vations and their interpretation within a research field; and 
it is a systematic development of that scheme. The sciences 
thus define the problems and refine the methods suggested 
by metaphysics.
4 – Fantasy
Metaphysical theories have often been confused with fanta-
sies and fictions. Even the prolific Argentinean philosopher 
Mario Bunge concurs in this imprecision. While recognizing 
that atomistic physics descends from atomistic metaphysics, 
the latter was, in its inception, a great ‘fantasy’:
Ancient atomistics was, moreover, the first thoroughly natura-
listic ontology. However, it was also a grand fantasy, since its 
upholders, who claimed to explain everything, did not account 
in detail for anything in particular. The transmutation of atomis-
tics from a metaphysics into atomic physics took two millennia. 
(Bunge 2006, p. 156)
But then, if Bunge is right, it would follow that fantasies 
can eventually become part of physics, no matter how many 
centuries we have to wait for such a miracle. Bunge readily 
acknowledges that science also creates fictions (let me add 
that non-realistic philosophers even tend to look at scienti-
fic theories as great fictions) where they play an important 
heuristic role. But even though, apparently, wild fantasies 
are more likely to pop up in metaphysical territory, Bunge 
recognizes that once in a while quite bizarre fictions with no 
apparent usefulness also arise in science:
Amazingly, one of the wildest fantasies about parallel worlds is 
the brain-child of a physicist, Hugh Everet III (1957), and his the-
sis adviser John A. Wheeler. This is the many-worlds interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics. According to it, every calculated 
possibility is realized in some physical world. (Bunge 2006, p. 
210)
But, according to Bunge, in speculative metaphysics, fiction 
is not part of the heuristics; it is rather a constitutive feature 
of the discipline itself. Speculative metaphysics, therefore, 
consists in the construction of idle fictions. Fiction is an end 
in itself, not a mere detour designed to achieve knowledge of 
reality.
At the root of Bunge’s confusion between metaphysics and 
fantasy is what he understands by the term ‘fantasy’: expla-
nations whose degree of generality is so high that they do 
not refer in detail to anything particular and lack empirical 
import and testability. We cannot find out whether they are 
true or, at least, false.
However, the content of fantasies and fictions can be very de-
tailed and particular. The Lord of the Rings by JRR Tolkien 
is very detailed and particular. By contrast, as we have seen, 
the degree of generality of metaphysical claims is in fact very 
high. As Kit Fine says, in metaphysics we do not talk about 
dogs and cats or electrons and protons but of material parti-
culars; we do not talk of thunder and lightning or wars and 
battles but of events (2012, p. 16). But just because they do 
not apply specifically to anything in particular, general state-
ments cannot be deemed to be fantasy; generality only means 
that they apply to a very large number of individuals.
 
Similarly to scientists, metaphysicians and philosophers do 
occasionally create fictions as thought experiments, as de-
tours serving the investigation of reality. And these do have a 
heuristic role (for instance, Descartes’ evil genius). But meta-
physics is an investigation of the nature of reality, and is far 
from the realm of fantasy and fiction. We know that fantasies 
and fictions are not true, in the sense that they do not exist 
or take place in the space-time we inhabit (though they take 
place in a fictional space-time). They are not true and do not 
claim to be. We can therefore state their truth value. On the 
contrary, and even though metaphysics purports to be true, 
we cannot state the truth value of its claims. 
But does this entail idleness or uselessness? As we have seen 
in the previous section, the answer is no. Let me recall here 
that Richard Feynman chose the ‘ancient atomistic’ hypothe-
sis as the perfect legacy for future generations:
If, in some cataclysm, all of scientific knowledge were to be des-
troyed, and only one sentence passed on to the next generations 
of creatures, what statement would contain the most informa-
tion in the fewest words? I believe it is the atomic hypothesis (or 
the atomic fact, or whatever you wish to call it) that all things 
are made of atoms - little particles that move around in perpe-
tual motion, attracting each other when they are a little distance 
apart, but repelling upon being squeezed into one another. In 
that one sentence, you will see, there is an enormous amount of 
information about the world, if just a little imagination and thin-
king are applied... (1963, p. 4) 
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Indeed, with imagination and reflection, a huge amount of in-
formation about the world can be extracted from the ‘atomic 
hypothesis’, even though, at its inception, it exhibited a high 
degree of generality, was ‘vague’ and lacking in detail, and 
had no empirical import. This hypothesis proposed that all 
things in the world are made up of atoms. But apart from sta-
ting the mere existence of atoms, something was said about 
their motion: that it is perpetual; and that atoms attract each 
other when they are a little distance apart, but repel each 
other upon being squeezed into one another. Now, starting 
from this brief description of their motion, we can foresee, 
for example, that atoms can be joined together to form large 
structures without collapsing at the same point.
Moreover, and contrary to what Bunge says, the transmuta-
tion of atomistics from a metaphysics into atomic physics did 
not actually take two millennia. Even though it was born in 
ancient Greece with Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus, 
atomism was a doctrine maudite throughout most of its his-
tory. It was only widely accepted from the 17th century, albeit 
reluctantly. Seventeenth-century natural philosophers cra-
ved a mathematical description of all phenomena based on 
an atomistic or corpuscular theory of matter. Although this 
would be achieved only by the end of the 19th century, the new 
programme soon started paying off: it was philosophically 
inspiring, offering a radically new approach of the unders-
tanding of nature. It conveyed a cohesive conception of the 
world, could replace Aristotelian physics and metaphysics, 
had enormous explanatory power and held the promise of 
endless discoveries. 
Hence, Feynman’s trust in the ‘atomic hypothesis’ stemmed 
from the fact that it inspired a research programme of formi-
dable reach. He expressed the hope that the same successful 
research programme could be repeated by the cataclysm sur-
vivors.
In fact, if metaphysical theories are not analyzed by isola-
ting their propositions, and if their unobservable entities and 
processes are not surgically excised as naturalistic metaphy-
sicians do, they typically exhibit an indirect relevance to em-
pirical findings. To understand their richness, metaphysical 
theories should be taken in their entirety. 
In ‘Metaphysics and Science’ (1959), C. H. Whiteley gave two 
examples, among others, to show the difference between eva-
luating metaphysical entities and propositions in isolation 
and understanding them in their context: Spinoza and Plato. 
For Spinoza, there was only one substance in the universe, 
mind and matter being its separate attributes. Given this 
isolated statement, notes Whiteley, it seems that we cannot 
really go very far. However, if taken in the context of Spino-
za’s complete theory, we can formulate the hypothesis that 
there is a set of laws statable in terms of physical concepts by 
which every physical event can be fully explained; that there 
is a set of laws statable in terms of mental concepts by which 
every mental event can be fully explained; and that there is a 
corresponding mental event and a corresponding mental law 
to every physical event and to every physical law. 
For Plato, a horse was a horse because it participated in the 
Form ‘horse’ that existed independently of all horses. Taken 
this way, no observation can confirm or refute this claim and, 
therefore, at first glance, it seems totally irrelevant. But if we 
place it within the whole of Plato’s thought, we can draw from 
it a rule regarding the correct method for the investigation of 
nature: things should be classified according to their types. 
So, since each individual is but an imperfect instance of a 
type, we must start by understanding the types, ignoring the 
individual incidents and anomalies.  
5 – Lack of Imagination
Curiously enough, metaphysics is accused, at the same time, 
of lacking imagination. The ‘imagination’ of metaphysicians 
has fallen far short of the complexity of scientific theories 
and the natural world revealed by science. Metaphysicians 
lose in the imagination contest. For instance, Lawrence Sklar 
underlines the lack of imagination of philosophers who dare 
to think independently of ‘the results of physics’. Science ulti-
mately proves they are mistaken, putting them in an awkward 
position:
Time and time again philosophy that tries to reason a priori, wit-
hout reliance on the data of observation and experiment, and to 
come to conclusions about how the world must be has seen itself 
embarrassed by the revelations of science. This has shown us 
that the aprioristic philosophers have been quite limited in their 
imaginations when they attempted to delimit the realm of possi-
bilities for the nature of the world. Without the results of physics, 
what philosopher would have considered the wide variety of pos-
sibilities for the nature of space and time, of causation, and of the 
kinds of objectivity and its lack that the radical new theories of 
physics have posed as possibilities for our consideration? (Sklar 
1992, p. 230) 
Now, metaphysicians are damned if they do and damned if 
they don’t: on the one hand, they are criticized for being too 
imaginative, for creating worlds of fantasy which are very dif-
ferent from the world described by ‘the science of the day’; on 
the other hand, they are criticized for being unable to match 
the imaginative worlds described by scientists: the quantum 
realm, black holes, superstrings, multi-dimensionality... 
But is this so? If imagination, creativity and weirdness are the 
only issues in play here, then Leibniz’s universe of monads or 
the universe of Hegel or Plato can surely compete with the 
quantum world. In addition, let us not forget that imaginative 
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scientific theories typically entail metaphysical parts. 
The case of quantum physics is, perhaps, the best example 
to show how science provides the most creative and amazing 
ideas or that science discovers worlds whose uniqueness goes 
beyond all that metaphysicians can imagine. And ‘quantum 
leaps’ are one of the most striking and ‘imaginative’ features 
of quantum mechanics. According to Maxwell’s electroma-
gnetic theory, any charged particle moving in a curved tra-
jectory has to radiate electromagnetic energy. Such particles 
will therefore end up losing energy and fall spiralling in 
the direction of a core. But Rutherford’s model of the atom 
had brought to light a particularly intriguing problem: the 
electrons revolved around the nucleus indefinitely without 
emitting radiation. To solve the problem, Bohr proposed the 
quantization of atomic electrons: electrons can occupy cer-
tain fixed orbits of energy without emitting radiation, i.e., wi-
thout energy loss. They leap from a ‘privileged’ orbit to ano-
ther without having the possibility of ever being in the space 
between those orbits, i.e., without passing through a conti-
nuous series of intermediate states. But, one may ask, where 
are the electrons between one orbit and the other? Strictly 
speaking, the answer is: nowhere. The electron leaps from 
one orbit to another, but in this interval there is no motion, 
which implies a discontinuous variation in the atoms of time. 
When leaping, i.e., when passing from a stationary state to 
another, the electrons emit or absorb electromagnetic energy 
in discrete quantities, the photons, and the state of the elec-
tron is only subject to considerations of possibility. It is as if 
the electron in a stationary state could ‘choose’ between seve-
ral possibilities of transition to other stationary states. Bohr 
emphasized that this was a game of chance. 
Bohr’s electron leaps aroused much criticism. Louis de Bro-
glie, for example, remarked that it was a bizarre alliance of 
concepts and formulas from classical dynamics with quan-
tum methods. The electron is seen at first as a material point 
of classical mechanics that clearly describes its orbit under 
the influence of the Coulomb force. But then quantifying 
conditions are abruptly introduced leading to electron leaps 
that cannot be described by classical concepts, when these 
were the starting point. Erwin Schrödinger also thought it 
was absurd that no explanation was provided for the lack of 
electron radiation in the stationary state; but then there was 
radiation when it leaped from one orbit to another. ‘If one has 
to stick to these damned quantum jumping, then I regret ever 
having been involved in this thing!’, declared Schrödinger in 
1926 when Bohr tried to persuade him to support his idea 
(Jammer 1974, p. 324). However, the correctness or not of 
Bohr’s proposal does not concern me here. What matters is 
the feeling of strangeness that it caused since it contradicted 
the maxim that, among other philosophers, Leibniz followed: 
natura non facit saltus, ‘nature does not make leaps’. 
But was Bohr’s proposal as unique as it seems at first sight? 
Is it appropriate to say that philosophers cannot compete 
in ‘imagination’ with physicists? In fact, an equally strange 
theory was advanced more than twenty centuries ago by the 
philosopher Epicurus. For Epicurus, movement, quantity 
and time are discontinuous. Movement is performed in jerks 
covering the total number of space units in a total number 
of time units. According to Simplicius, Epicurus stated that 
one cannot say that an atom is moving in a minimum inter-
val, but only that it has already been moving (Konstan 1989). 
Atoms can never ‘be in motion’, but ‘have always been in 
motion’. A body moving along a line moves along the whole 
line without moving over the indivisible parts in which that 
line consists; rather it has always already moved. This implies 
that something may have already gone over a distance wit-
hout ever going over it or may have completed a walk without 
having previously walked. Epicurus assumed that the time it 
takes for an atom to travel a minimum distance, i.e., a mini-
mum length, is the minimum temporal length. As the atom 
is the minimal discrete body and consists of minimal parts, 
time is also divisible and consists of minimum continuous 
periods consisting of indivisible temporal units, time distin-
guishable only in thought (Epicurus, 062). Being indivisible, 
a temporal extension is not such that a movement can take 
place in it. ‘Has been moving’ and not ‘is moving’ is therefore 
the relationship that a moving body has with the unit-parts 
in which space and time consist. As Aristotle saw, this theory 
entails that movement is made by jerks (Physica, VI, 231b25-
232a17). The atom has to jump from one set of spatial units 
to another, given that there is neither space nor time in which 
its progression between one unit and the other can occur. 
Placed side by side, Epicurus’ ideas seem to be a spectacular 
anticipation of Bohr’s atom model. But we need not go that 
far. Perhaps there are only a limited number of theoretical 
views when the human mind focuses on key issues, humans 
therefore being doomed to repeat themselves. Have we not 
often felt that everything has already been thought by the 
ancient Greeks? 
However, there is more at stake here. What lies behind many 
of the accusations of lack of imagination in metaphysics is the 
belief that real novelty is best propelled by empirical research. 
Indeed, we often find the following view regarding the history 
of atomism and other philosophical theories: how wrong are 
the ‘mere speculations’ of metaphysicians! No wonder, they 
dare to speak without performing empirical experiments. The 
upshot is that science subsequently corrects them, pointing 
out all their mistakes. Atoms, for instance, had nothing to 
do with what Democritus and Epicurus supposed; they are 
actually incomparably more complex.
However, this is a very simplistic view. Firstly, those who be-
lieved in hard and incorruptible atoms were not only Demo-
critus and Epicurus, but generations of scientists, including 
the most eminent. Secondly, when the science of an era shows 
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the flaws of a metaphysical theory, it typically means that the 
same science adopted a different metaphysics. Thirdly, and 
curiously enough, Feynman would not leave as a legacy for 
the cataclysm survivors the findings of contemporary science, 
its complex and divisible atoms; he would leave them the ato-
mistic programme of the ancient Greeks and of Newton, the 
programme that is now faced with so many problems. The 
reason is that Feynman knew that it was by following the path 
proposed by this programme, albeit a ‘wrong’ one, that we got 
to where we have arrived today. The atomistic programme 
is perhaps showing symptoms of fatal illness, but we cannot 
close our eyes to the fact that the outdated atomistic concep-
tions, even though now considered misleading and inaccu-
rate, enabled over the centuries a tremendous increase of 
knowledge as they paved the way for their own renewal. 
It is nonetheless true that some accepted metaphysical theo-
ries may act as obstacles for the advancement of science. All 
metaphysical theories are limited and imperfect, as are all 
our theories and is all our knowledge - but they are also open 
to criticism; and one of the metaphysicians’ missions is preci-
sely to criticise them and learn from their mistakes.
6 – Lack of Foresight
A similar charge to that of Lawrence Sklar occurs in James 
Ladyman and Don Ross’s ‘In Defence of Scientism’ (2007). 
Ladyman and Ross, presumptive heirs of David Hume and 
the logical positivists, proved to be two of the most strident 
voices speaking out against non-naturalistic metaphysics, 
which they quite rightly describe as a ‘neo-scholasticism’. 
Ladyman and Ross defend a naturalistic metaphysics meti-
culously informed by science. Their naturalistic metaphy-
sics is interested, most of all, in the ontology of the universe; 
and the science, above all the physics, of a time is held to be 
the main source of information about the ontology. Howe-
ver, what is the science or physics ‘of a time’? Here we have 
what may be considered a vague expression: the physics of a 
time. As I have already stated, the putative ‘results of science 
of a time’ are subject to interpretation. For example, is the 
quantum physics of our time the Copenhagen interpretation, 
Louis de Broglie’s interpretation or David Bohm’s interpreta-
tion? Which one should a naturalistic metaphysics informed 
by quantum physics follow? Should it follow the dominant 
school? But what are the assumptions behind this prescrip-
tion? 
Due to an alleged brotherhood between metaphysics and 
common sense, Ladyman and Ross conclude that metaphy-
sics is made to declare as impossible states, entities or pro-
cesses that science later admits as possible:
Philosophers have often regarded as impossible states of affairs 
that science has come to entertain. For example, metaphysicians 
confidently pronounced that non-Euclidean geometry is impos-
sible as a model of physical space, that it is impossible that there 
not be deterministic causation, that non-absolute time is impos-
sible, and so on. Physicists learned to be comfortable with each 
of these ideas, along with others that confound the expectations 
of common sense more profoundly. (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 
pp. 16-17)
Because this is intended as a statement of fact, it is subject to 
a counterexample. In fact, as Marie Cariou states, a metaphy-
sician like Leibniz devised a non-Euclidean space avant la 
lettre, a space where everything is contained and where eve-
rything is reflected to infinity, a true ‘geometry of deepness’ 
(Cariou 1978, p. 100; see also Giust 1990). Furthermore, as 
the French physicist Bernard Pullman notes, the use of the 
word ‘impossible’ is far from exclusive to philosophers: 
It is surprising to see how many thinkers and scientists, even 
very prominent, have used the word ‘impossible’, unfortunately 
and ultimately in a wrong way. Often, as modern chemist Ch. 
Weizmann (1874-1952) said, ‘the impossible takes a long time’, 
a statement which is especially strong in the field of atomic and 
molecular structures.1  (Pullman 1995, p. 180).
Indeed, counterexamples do include scientists themselves, 
since generations of scientists believed in nothing but Eucli-
dean geometry, in deterministic causality, in absolute time! 
Claiming to know that it is impossible that non-naturalistic 
theories about possible worlds, universals or modalities may 
someday have some empirical usefulness, Ladyman and Ross, 
and other naturalistic philosophers, actually make the same 
mistake as the philosophers they admonish for declaring as 
impossible states of things that science would accept later. 
Without mentioning the remarkable case of atomism, let me 
here recall E. A.  Burtt’s The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Modern Physical Science (1924), where he shows that meta-
physical concepts such as substance, essence and form were 
essential in Kepler’s work and the concepts of space, time and 
mass in Newton’s. 
The truth is that the benefit of the doubt is always given to 
mathematics, but not to metaphysics: “There are parts of ma-
thematics that clearly don’t seem to be describing anything 
physical, but let us never forget Kant’s embarrassment over 
non-Euclidean geometry”, write Ladyman and Ross (2010, 
p. 182). Therefore, even though mathematics creates worlds 
or ‘mathematical entities’ that apparently have no connexion 
with the physical world, we cannot exclude the possibility 
that, in the future, we will be proved wrong. Who knows if 
these worlds and ‘entities’ that are nothing today but mathe-
matical will not become physical tomorrow, as happened 
with the positron? Let us not behave like the philosopher 
1  - “Il est surprenant d’observer combien de penseurs et de savants, même très éminents, ont utilisé, malencontreusement et finalement à tort, le mot “impossible”. Souvent, comme 
l’a dit Ch. Weizmann, chimiste moderne (1874-1952), “l’impossible prend plus longtemps”, affirmation qui revêt toute sa force dans le domaine des structures atomiques et molé-
culaires.”
8N° 1   2015
Vol. 2
Kant who did not foresee that Euclidean geometry was going 
to be surpassed by non-Euclidean geometry. Unfortunately, 
this open-mindedness is rarely extended to metaphysics... 
As for Kant’s case regarding Euclidean geometry, Joseph 
Agassi touched a sore spot when he wrote that:
Much scorn has been poured on Kant’s head on account of his 
inability to foretell that Gauss and Einstein were going to break 
away from his aprioristic adherence to Euclid. Everybody before 
Kant, including Newton, held similar views, but this only makes 
the need for a scapegoat all the more intense. And the scapegoat 
is Kant. The need for scapegoats is based on the view that scien-
tists should be able to avoid error. (1969, p. 5)
This is particularly significant as the passage is taken from an 
essay where Agassi argues that Kant himself is in a way the 
source of non-Euclidean geometry, as it was in opposition to 
him that Gauss was thinking. Agassi also shows the relevance 
of Leibniz’s and Kant’s programmes for both Einstein’s theo-
ry of relativity and the theory of fields. 
It is clear that Kant is chosen as the scapegoat because he is a 
philosopher. Not even Newton the Scientist was able to fore-
see what future was reserved for Euclidean geometry. Moreo-
ver, ultimately, what was Kant doing? He was following Lady-
man and Ross’s advice: he chose to philosophize based on the 
‘results of the science of his time’! As those results were, as 
they typically are, imperfect, perhaps it would have been bet-
ter not to do so. Now, it is not fair that, once more, philoso-
phers are damned if they do and damned if they don’t. On the 
one hand, they are to blame for not submitting to the ‘science 
of their time’. On the other, they are to blame when they sub-
mit to it, instead of anticipating the science of the future! 
Aren’t scientists fortunate for always being remembered for 
their success, even when they believed they had already ar-
rived at the fundamental level, or that there was something 
like the phlogiston? It can be argued that the ontology of 
outdated physical theories such as the theory of phlogiston, 
the ether theory of light and the theory of the caloric were 
not simply discarded, as they described modal relationships 
between phenomena that were subsumed in later scientific 
theories. I agree. Mistakes often contain some truth and La-
voisier’s chemistry was, to a certain extent, a sequel of the 
chemistry of phlogiston (Vihalemm 2000).2 However, the 
phlogiston theory was very inaccurate and phlogiston did not 
exist. Also, in defence of Kant and the legions of scientists who 
believed in Euclidean geometry: Euclidean geometry was not 
completely discarded neither. At low speeds and small physi-
cal distances space remains Euclidean at first sight.
Finally, we can still ask whether it is true that, today, as La-
dyman and Ross state, only physicists are comfortable with 
non-Euclidean geometry, indeterminism, or non-absolute 
time; and if they actually are comfortable. Did not scientists, 
metaphysicians, and curious laypeople alike have to adapt 
their way of thinking to these discoveries? And if scientists 
are indeed comfortable with them now, perhaps this comfort 
should not be praised. Comfort may always betray a mere 
acceptance, a withdrawal from understanding, as seems to be 
the case of quantum physics.
Furthermore, non-Euclidean geometry, non-absolute time 
and indeterminism were at first out of the scientists’ com-
fort zone as well. Their common sense was also disturbed. 
In particular, acceptance of the quantum world was (and still 
is) a disturbing process. It was a difficult theory to accept, 
as would have been expected by, for instance, Thomas Kuhn 
who described scientists as very conservative. It was in fact 
so hard to accept that some of the physicists involved turned 
to the Eastern religions and ways of thinking in an attempt 
to achieve a better understanding of quantum phenomena 
and relativity. Austrian scientist Fritjof Capra, who was once 
Heisenberg’s assistant, reported in his book Uncommon Wis-
dom: Conversations with Remarkable People:
 
In 1929 Heisenberg spent some time in India as the guest of ce-
lebrated Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore, with whom he had 
long conversations about science and Indian philosophy. This 
introduction of Indian science brought Heisenberg great vision, 
he told me. He began to see that the recognition of relativity, 
interconnectedness, and impermanence as fundamental aspects 
of physical reality, which had been so difficult for himself and 
his fellow physicists, was the very basis of the Indian spiritual 
traditions. ‘After these conversations with Tagore’, he said, ‘some 
of the ideas that had seemed so crazy suddenly made more sense. 
That was a great help for me.’ (1988, pp. 42-43)
The surprise and shock that relativity and quantum mecha-
nics caused aroused deep metaphysical and even religious 
concerns in the scientists involved. Niels Bohr found analo-
gies between complementarity and the Chinese metaphysics 
of yin-yang. Schrödinger took an interest in the Vedanta. 
Planck, Schrödinger and Heisenberg devoted chapters of 
their writings to the relation of science and religion (but not 
Dirac, who was a fierce atheist). Einstein’s meditations on 
this subject are also well known. His God, he said, was Spino-
za’s God, the one that dwells in the harmony of all things, and 
his religion was ‘cosmic’.
7 – The Problem of Intuition
Intuition is a vast, complex and controversial issue. The term 
has been used both by the layman and by philosophers and 
scientists in so many different ways that it is plunged into 
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qualitative nature and the latter had a quantitative nature. But this quantitative approach to chemistry was a sequel of qualitative chemical investigations formed in the context 
of the phlogiston theory.
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deep confusion. Intuition in its common (and etymological) 
sense as a direct and immediate vision does not explain what 
that vision is and how it works. Moreover, the cognitive value 
of such a vision has not been settled. 
The core of the charge Ladyman and Ross make against the 
alleged methodology of non-naturalistic metaphysicians 
lies in the kind of argument these metaphysicians use: the 
constant appeal to intuition. Worse than that, non-naturalis-
tic metaphysicians trust those intuitions more than they trust 
the ‘results of science’. The intuitionist methodology is viewed 
with suspicion by scientists. For Ladyman and Ross, as for 
many of the empiricists and naturalistic metaphysicians who 
are critical of non-naturalistic metaphysics, the problem with 
‘intuition’ is that it is not subject to empirical verification; 
intuitions cannot be subject to scientific scrutiny. Thus, we 
are doomed to remain ignorant of their accuracy. 
Not that Ladyman and Ross refuse to recognize ‘intuition’ 
in science. They admit that it is often said of a good physi-
cist that he had a solid intuition. But, in this case, the use of 
the word intuition is different, because it refers ‘to the expe-
rienced practitioner’s trained ability to see at a glance how 
their abstract theoretical structure probably – in advance of 
essential careful checking – maps onto a problem space’ (La-
dyman and Ross 2007, p. 15). Intuition in science is usually 
seen as an anticipation of results prior to their discovery, the 
steps and the details leading to them, a guessing of sublimi-
nal connections between things or events, as when Newton 
saw the apple fall.  
But intuition occurring in metaphysics is often seen, stran-
gely enough, as something close to the mystics’ revelation, as 
a personal experience of a simple presence in consciousness, 
so splendid that it does not require any further steps. And it 
is a presence of something that, by its very nature, cannot be 
present: it is invisible and ineffable. Now, all knowledge can 
be conveyed in words, as the positivists argued. It thus follows 
that there can be no knowledge stemming from metaphysical 
intuitions. The attack of the positivists against metaphysics 
stemmed largely from this weird identification of metaphy-
sics with the mystical or the religious, fuelled by the mystical 
bent in philosophers such as Schopenhauer and Bergson.
 
Similarly to the positivists, Ladyman and Ross declare that 
metaphysical intuitions have no epistemic value. Science, 
precisely, has shown that many of the intuitions of common 
sense about the world were wrong. They also advance an evo-
lutionary argument against the reliability of intuitions: these 
evolved in the medium size world; they are adapted neither to 
the macro nor to the micro scale. It is thus highly implausible 
that intuition can lead us to the knowledge of realities whose 
scale differs so much from the one we are used to.
To understand Ladyman and Ross’s criticism we need to 
recall that, since the 1960s, a phenomenon has occurred in 
‘analytic’ philosophy’ that has spread like a virus: the use and 
abuse, by many ‘analytical’ philosophers (David Chalmers, 
David Lewis, Saul Kripke) of the term ‘intuition’ or ‘intuiti-
vely’ in their arguments. The upshot was a real misfortune for 
philosophy in general because it is now usually assumed that 
the philosophical method par excellence is intuition. There is 
the idea that philosophers (the case is, of course, more severe 
with metaphysicians) turn to ‘intuition’ when their argu-
ments are exhausted; that, when a philosophical dispute is 
carried far enough, it will reach a point where nothing else 
is at play than competing intuitions about the arguments’ 
assumptions, for example, that ‘intuitively’, the outside world 
exists or that, ‘intuitively’, only my mind exists.
 
Now, how can anyone claim that we can switch from ‘intuiti-
vely, the outside world exists’ to ‘intuition of the reality of the 
external world is true’? What kind of authority can be ascri-
bed to ‘intuitions’ once they claim self-legitimation and do 
not face ‘the court of experience’?
 
As we are all uncertain of what exactly ‘intuition’ is and the 
degree of confidence it deserves, many other philosophers 
feel disturbed with this image of their discipline. This image, 
created largely by some of the discipline’s own practitioners 
themselves, contributes significantly to its caricature as ‘arm-
chair speculation’, a mere conceptual analysis distant from 
any form of empirical inquiry.
One of the troubled philosophers is Herman Cappelen. In 
‘Philosophy Without Intuitions’ (2012) and even more re-
cently (due to the responses obtained in defence of the use 
of intuition in philosophy, for example, by David Chalmers, 
2014), in ‘X-Phi Without Intuitions’ (2014) Cappelen rebel-
led against this prevailing image. In his essays, he criticizes 
what he calls the metaphilosophical thesis of ‘Centralization’: 
contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evi-
dence for their philosophical theories. Through a linguistic 
and textual analysis of (unfortunately numerous) philoso-
phical excerpts where the term ‘intuition’ and its derivatives 
occur, Cappelen comes to the conclusion that ‘Centralization’ 
is false. Its authors have mistaken beliefs about their own 
methods. Most of the time, reference to ‘intuition’ can be 
removed (Cappelen 2012, pp. 63-64). It describes statements 
obtained with little thought (Cappelen 2012, pp. 65-68) or 
signals a proposition which can either be justified or has 
already been justified, without taking a stance on the issue 
(Cappelen  2012, pp. 68-71).
Cappelen also analyzed several mental experiments deve-
loped by philosophers and concluded that, in these cases as 
well, they are not actually based on intuitions. What happens 
is precisely the opposite: philosophers are interested in the 
reasons behind the answers. If the answers are not justified 
by reasons and arguments they are deemed uninteresting. 
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What philosophers do is to provide reasons, to argue and to 
detect precisely those beliefs or judgments that were not jus-
tified and are mistakenly called ‘intuitions’ (Cappelen 2012, 
chap. 8). 
It is most unfortunate that philosophers have made a poor 
choice of words when the least one might expect from them is 
the careful use of language.
 
But though I suspect that Cappelen is right with regard to 
‘analytical’ non-naturalistic metaphysics, i.e., that it is lar-
gely a problem of the reckless use of vocabulary, intuition is 
a much deeper problem than a mere lack of terminological 
marksmanship. The question cannot be addressed so lightly. 
The association of philosophy and metaphysics with intuition 
has a long and persistent history. Philosophers have been 
mentioning intuition since the beginning of their discipline. 
The phenomenon did not start with the ‘analytical’ metaphy-
sicians, nor with Bergson, Schelling, Husserl, not even with 
Kant or Descartes, all of them philosophers for whom intui-
tion played a crucial role. Aristotle and Plato already mentio-
ned intuition in connection with philosophy. 
But the problem of ancient intuitionist philosophers was their 
defence that it is possible to have beliefs justified by intuition. 
However, nowadays, fallibilism is widespread: such beliefs 
can no longer be seen as solid. 
In a recent paper, Jiri Benowsky (2013) acknowledges that 
science (physics, experimental psychology, cognitive science) 
may be useful in assessing the value of some metaphysical 
theories, those closer to empirical investigation (we may 
think of determinism and indeterminism), but not the value 
of those which are too distant from an empirical basis be-
cause ‘intuition’ is all that we have (concerning tropes, uni-
versals, mereological composition, etc.). He focuses on this 
latter case. Many metaphysical theories are counter-intui-
tive, but he believes that many intuitive theories are based 
on our everyday contingent phenomenal experience. He thus 
rightly stresses the fact that metaphysics is not far from all 
kinds of experience, is not a product of a ‘pure reason’, or 
‘armchair speculation’. Benowsky analyses four examples of 
such metaphysical reasoning. He concludes that, from the 
same phenomenological experience, two competing meta-
physical theories may arise and that our experience of the 
world is neutral with respect to both of them. For instance, 
from seeing an apple changing over time from red and juicy 
to brown and rotten, we can endorse either Endurantism and 
Perdurantism. Our experience of the world does not decide in 
favour of one or the other. Therefore, according to Benowsky, 
we should be extremely careful when appealing to these kinds 
of ‘intuitions’ while doing metaphysics, as they are, more of-
ten than not, misleading and illusory. Benowsky’s final and 
controversial proposal is the endorsement of a kind of anti-
realism whereby metaphysics is understood as the inquiry 
into the world as it is given to us (it tells us what our concepts 
are like) and not as it is. However, I believe there is no need 
to go this far.
I rather believe that the putative source of a metaphysical 
theory should not be confused with its method. It is one thing 
to mention intuition in a philosophical theory; it is quite ano-
ther thing to say that intuition is the method used in meta-
physics. The method of metaphysics is none other than the 
philosophical, rational method, in which the architecture of 
the arguments is subject to critical scrutiny and which obeys 
the criterion of clarity. And the real source of a metaphysical 
theory, as also the source of a scientific theory, is a problem 
that needs to be solved. If in the process of solving it there 
are appeals to intuition they have to be submitted to criticism 
or to tests. What matters is the theories’ explanatory power 
and their resilience to criticism and tests. This criticism is 
not confined to claims purportedly based on intuition, but to 
claims based on the senses, reason, evidence, etc. All of them 
fail. There is no source of certain knowledge. 
Most criticism of metaphysics is based on these kinds of shaky 
assumptions: that there is a source of certain knowledge; that 
there is a rigid partition between a priori and a posteriori; 
and the subsequent belief in a reliable knowledge (a poste-
riori) and a pseudo or presumptive knowledge (a priori).
In addition, the fact that there is no source of certain 
knowledge does not entail the endorsement of anti-realism. 
We can learn about the world if we criticize and test our 
claims, whether they are based on the senses, reason, evi-
dence or intuition…But I do not wish to join the realism or 
non-realism debate here.
Philosophy is a critical and dialogic activity. Both in science 
and in metaphysics, before being accepted, intuitions are 
investigated and their consequences analyzed, if not by their 
protagonists then by someone else. To say, like Ladyman and 
Ross, that the difference is that metaphysical intuitions are 
taken as evidence while intuitions in science have only a heu-
ristic value, is unacceptable. If intuition does play an impor-
tant role in knowledge, that role is heuristic both in science 
and metaphysics and not dogmatic in any case, particularly 
since it rarely can be trusted - problems are usually more 
complicated than intuition supposes. 
So, for the third time, metaphysicians are damned if they 
do and damned if they don’t: they are criticized for putting 
forward arguments that are claimed to be indisputable, ‘dog-
matic’…; and they are also criticized for their endless disputes 
and their failure to reach a consensus. 
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8 – Independence from Expe-
rience
Basically, all charges mentioned above are derived from 
a single big problem: the problem of metaphysics’ inde-
pendence from experience. Despite the verification principle 
of the logical positivists ceasing to be invoked in order to 
debunk metaphysical propositions, these continue to be re-
garded as unreliable due to their exemption from empirical 
testing (in fact, the problem concerns all philosophy and not 
only metaphysics). What are metaphysical theories for if we 
cannot even figure out if they are true or, at least, false? And if 
we cannot even know if they are false, as no empirical test can 
decide this, how can we choose between metaphysical theo-
ries, especially when, as we have seen, appeals to ‘intuition’ 
cannot justify per se any assertion? 
 
But in what way is metaphysics independent from expe-
rience? Is this true? If metaphysics is in some way linked to 
experience, what is the nature of that link? In fact, and typi-
cally, metaphysical theories are underdetermined by empi-
rical data; it is always possible to conceive, for each one of 
them, an opposite theory that is also consistent with the 
empirical data. Anything that exists or happens is compatible 
with both the metaphysical thesis of the reality of space-time 
and with the metaphysical thesis of its unreality; as it is com-
patible with both the existence of Platonic Ideas and the ab-
sence of Platonic Ideas. Therefore, coherence with empirical 
data cannot determine which one is true.
 
Moreover, the findings of science cannot act as verdicts on 
or rebuttals of metaphysical theories. To assert that quantum 
physics proves that the thesis that all events have a cause 
is wrong or that relativity proves that the nature of space is 
this way and not that way is an illusion. First, metaphysical 
theories have such a high degree of generality that experience 
(which is, by its very nature, limited and localized) cannot 
decide for or against them. Second, the so-called ‘results of 
science’, as I already pointed out, are often interpreted accor-
ding to different and contradictory metaphysical views.
But let us not forget that the association with truth is a pro-
blem not only for philosophy and metaphysics but for science 
as well, in spite of the latter’s connection with empirical evi-
dence. Firstly, scientific theories, like metaphysical ones, are 
underdetermined by empirical data. They are far from being 
fully verified or corroborated by empirical tests; otherwise 
they would not be theories. All theories are theories precisely 
because they are an attempt to see beyond what is empirically 
given. Secondly, if the impossibility of knowing ‘for sure’ the 
truth value of metaphysical theories is a problem, the ‘court 
of experience’, so often invoked to decide the truth value of 
scientific theories, is also a problem; it is not, as empiricists 
think, an unequivocal guarantee and a source of authority. 
The truth is that the empirical basis of science is itself hypo-
thetical. It is, as we have seen, subject to interpretation and 
even though empirical experiences do not take place in meta-
physics but in science, falsification in science is not conclu-
sive.
Nevertheless, it is possible to choose rationally between ri-
val metaphysical theories, despite the fact that the findings 
of science cannot directly falsify them through an empirical 
experiment and despite the fact that it cannot be proved that 
our favourite metaphysical theory is true. 
That choice often takes place in scientific contexts. Many 
metaphysical theories were abandoned by science as they be-
came too difficult to maintain. For example, Descartes’ theo-
ry of ‘swirling vortices’ was abandoned in favour of atomism. 
The reason behind this choice was that atomism proved to be 
much more manageable and fertile when transferred to the 
language of science. The vortices hypothesis did not succeed, 
while atomism was able to launch an incredibly successful 
research programme. Similarly, metaphysical theories of the 
‘one universe without generation and corruption’, defended 
by the ancient Greeks and Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, were 
eventually abandoned in favour of theories of the universe as 
an evolutionary and corruptible system.
Granted, falsification is not conclusive even for scientific 
theories, but we nevertheless prefer not to use the term ‘falsi-
fication’ when metaphysical theories are at play, as falsifica-
tions typically involve crucial experiments. I believe that, for 
the sake of clarity, the terms ‘refute’, ‘rebut’ should be adop-
ted when scientific theories are involved, but not when meta-
physical hypothesis and theories are involved. I prefer to say 
that metaphysical theories, when judged as inaccurate, are 
‘indirectly falsified’, or ‘abandoned’. The reason is metaphy-
sical theories are not directly refutable, and are not discarded 
as scientific theories are: by direct refutation. The plum pud-
ding atom model hypothesized by J.J. Thomson was refuted 
by Rutherford with his gold foil experiment. Later, Ruther-
ford’s atom was also rendered obsolete by direct refutation.
But that is not the case with metaphysical theories. Although 
quantum physics seems to argue strongly in favour of inde-
terminism, there was also the theory that defended that if all 
the initial conditions could be known, then we would find out 
that the universe is deterministic; even to this day, different 
interpretations of the so-called ‘results’ of quantum physics 
subsist. A metaphysical theory can be abandoned by science 
in favour of another, but it doesn’t simply disappear. Even 
when they sound bizarre to the ears and the science of to-
day, for instance, Plato’s Forms, metaphysical theories keep 
all their appeal and never cease to be inspiring (for Heisen-
berg, quantum physics had in fact decided in favour of Plato’s 
Forms. Heisenberg 1958, pp 71-72). And we never know if 
they will play an important role in the future.
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By inspiring research programmes, some metaphysical 
theses become part of science, i.e., some metaphysical theses 
become partly empirically tractable. That in nature deter-
minism or indeterminism reigns, that something remains 
unchanged through change, that the whole equals the sum of 
its parts, these are all theses that remain metaphysical even if 
the science of an era adopts them and acts according to what 
they stipulate, and even if experiments do corroborate them 
to some extent. As Craig Callender notes (2011), testable 
theories typically involve metaphysical parts, for example, 
the hypothesis of the continuity or discontinuity of time. 
These non-testable parts are validated indirectly through the 
testable parts of the theories in which they operate: ‘Through 
experiment, confirmation and disconfirmation seeps upward 
through theory, but some bits – such as spatiotemporal conti-
nuity – are fairly well insulated’ (Callender 2011, p. 47). 
Therefore, metaphysics is far from being as alienated from 
the empirical world and scientific research as many seem to 
believe. Metaphysical theories also pertain to objects of expe-
rience and, together with science, investigate space and time, 
causality, possible worlds... And some metaphysical theses 
create even more bonds with experience when inserted into 
testable theories. Therefore, even though natural sciences re-
late to experience in a direct way, and metaphysics relates to 
experience indirectly through the sciences, both science and 
metaphysics are speculative-empirical activities.
However, this does not make science the judge of philosophy. 
It does not do so because, firstly, as we have seen, science 
does not completely falsify metaphysical theories; and se-
condly, because when science seems to threaten a metaphy-
sical theory, it is because another one was adopted, even if in 
an implicit way.
 
But even if we move further away from the scientific context 
it is still possible to choose between metaphysical theories. 
As Popper states (1982), it is possible to evaluate an irrefu-
table theory, unless it is simply an isolated proposition that 
entails acceptance or refusal without further ado. But this 
would also be the case if a scientific proposition was involved: 
why should we accept the equations of classical mechanics if 
we were not aware of the problems underlying them and the 
issues they address? 
A metaphysical or scientific theory is rational because it is 
part of a chain of problems which it is trying to solve. There-
fore, it can be discussed rationally by taking these problems 
into account. Critical discussions consist, precisely, in asses-
sing the quality of the offered solutions, in evaluating whe-
ther one particular solution is superior to the others or not; if 
it is inspiring and fruitful; if it has the ability to suggest new 
problems; and, finally, if it can be empirically tested. If it is a 
scientific theory, the answer to this last question will be posi-
tive. But empirical testing cannot decide if a theory is true. 
It can only decide if it is, in principle, false or if falsity was 
not proven. If it is a philosophical theory, the answer to the 
same question will be negative. All the others, however, can 
be applied to it. (Popper 1982, pp. 159–211) 
Human knowledge, all of it, is always hypothetical. There are 
no absolute truths. Therefore, the real issue is not to know 
for sure and immediately if philosophical or metaphysical 
theories - and the same goes for scientific theories - are true 
or false. The real issue is to investigate whether and how a 
theory can make a contribution in the search for truth. 
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